

Pointing and Morality in Chicago

David McNeill
University of Chicago

Although pointing appears to be a simple matter of aiming the hand at some target, it is in fact a process with several components. There is the *pointing sign* itself, and also an *origo* and a *deictic field* (which includes the target, the addressee and the speaker). The target, moreover, is not always present. A target can be *created* through the act of pointing, and this is the case with the gestures described in this chapter.

All of the components of pointing fit into a single semiotic structure. Anything with this structure is considered to be pointing. In North American culture, the pointing sign is canonically an extended index finger, or G-hand.¹ The deictic field is the spatial domain of both the referent of the pointing and the pointing itself. It must be part of pointing in order to ensure the identifiability of the referent. The perspective within the deictic field is such that the object is presented in this field from the point of view of an origo – the zero point from which the pointing is oriented. The term *origo* is from Bühler (1982). The end result of pointing is a structuring of space in terms of a spatial location, regarded from the origo, with everything in a framework that includes the target, the speaker and the addressee (see Hanks, 1990; Levinson, 1983). For example, pointing to a cup on the table in the next room organizes the space in terms of, not the room or space as laid out by a floor plan, but the object in a deictic field that shows the whereabouts of this object in relation to the origo.

The same process can map nonspatial content as well, doing this as if the content were spatial. A mapping of nonspace onto space creates a target object where none exists. This “abstract pointing” (McNeill et al., 1993) is a kind of gestural metaphor; something (space) is used to present something else that is inherently nonspatial. Bühler (1982) referred to such pointing as *deixis at phantasma*. In this chapter I analyze a case of *deixis at phantasma* and present evidence for its conversational functionality. In this example, the spatial construction that is achieved had a decisive effect on the course of the conversational interaction. A moral conflict

¹ Pointing is not limited to the classic extended index finger. To point requires only an extensible body part – hand, arm, and head are the most common – and it can also be accomplished with metaphorical body parts, such as imagined “eidola” beaming out from the eyes. The analysis in this chapter does not depend on the specific form of the gesture.

arose over the meaning of the created space, and this conflict, and the responses to it, became a turning point of the conversation.

DISTRIBUTION OF POINTING IN A CONVERSATION

The conversation I examine was recorded in the mid-1970s by Starkey Duncan in the (then) Department of Behavioral Sciences at the University of Chicago. It features two previously unacquainted male graduate students. Following Michael Silverstein's notation (explained later), one student is called Mr. A and the other Mr. B. Mr. A was a law student and Mr. B a social work student. The experimenter had introduced the participants to each other and video recording began immediately. The instructions were simply to "hold a conversation" for 10 or 15 minutes. There were spontaneous (unprompted, un-called-for) gestures throughout. All cases of pointing were metaphoric in the preceding sense; all were creating abstract meanings in space, and none were indicating real entities in space.

From the point of view of the pointing gestures, the conversation naturally breaks into three unequal phases.² Pointing dominated the middle phase.

The first phase was taken up with brief remarks about a questionnaire that both Mr. A and Mr. B had completed and about two other subjects in the experiment with whom Mr. A and Mr. B had previously held separate conversations, also video recorded. Mr. A and Mr. B performed 14 gestures in this phase. Of these, 57% were nondeictic metaphoric gestures of the "conduit" type (e.g., saying about one of the other experimental subjects, "so I kinda know her," and appearing at the same time to hold a bounded entity in the hand; see McNeill, 1992), 28% were points or deictics, and 14% were other types or were difficult to classify.

The second phase was the initiation of an attempt on Mr. A's part to discover Mr. B's academic biography, part of an interactional game that Silverstein (1997) dubbed Getting to Know You. It took a form typical among students, the exchange of academic histories, although in this instance the game was strangely one-sided. Mr. A probed; Mr. B evaded. Mr. B never quite revealed his educational past and gave the impression of wanting to avoid the topic. Mr. A's pursuit of Mr. B during this middle phase climaxed in the snippet focused on in this chapter. Mr. A and Mr. B together produced 13 gestures in the Getting To Know You phase, of which 23% were metaphoric and 77% deictic (there were no others). Thus, there was a dramatic upsurge of pointing during this phase.

The third phase began immediately after the pointing phase with the following:

A: óh óh óh óh óh I'm an óld Jésuit Boy mysélf // unfortunately

² The Mr. A – Mr. B conversation was transcribed by Starkey Duncan and was first used for analysis in the early 1980s by the Anaphora Workshop, at the University of Chicago. The Workshop included Starkey Duncan, Maya Hickmann, Elena Levy, Rebecca Passaneau, Michael Silverstein, and myself.

This statement was the start of the actual conversation in the sense that, from this point on, Mr. A and Mr. B talked about a mutually accepted topic, the character of Jesuit education, how it is special and how it compares to experiences at the University of Chicago, with Mr. A's "unfortunately" announcing the end of his until-then relentless pursuit of Mr. B and his past and his ushering in of a newfound fellowstudent camaraderie. The gesture situation also changed dramatically, in that pointing virtually disappeared. Of 110 gestures from Mr. A and Mr. B in the third phase (by far the largest part of the interaction), fully 93% were various kinds of nondeictic conduit metaphoric gestures, and only 6% were pointing.

The near total disappearance of pointing in Phase 3 can be explained with the aid of the concepts of the origo and the deictic field, and the use of pointing to create new references. Pointing embodies the orientation of the speaker toward a topic by placing the topic at a location in the deictic field vis-à-vis the speaker as the origo (McNeill, Cassell & Levy, 1993). The key to the second, pointing phase in the interaction was that the pointing by both speakers toward possible topics realized these topics as loci in space. Once Mr. A and Mr. B had found a topic, this motivation disappeared and with it the urge to point at empty space, and other forms of gestural metaphor took over.

THE POINTING PHASE

Table 12.1 gives the snippet of the Mr. A-Mr. B conversation that is the focus of this analysis. It picks up at the end of what has been Mr. A's already, by then, extended effort to uncover Mr. B's academic history. Mr. A had pursued this line for a number of turns and had earlier asked "Where did you come from before?" and Mr. B had offered "Mm, Iowa. I lived in Iowa." This led Mr. A down the garden path, however, because Mr. B proved reluctant to take up Iowa as a topic, but the Iowa theme is relevant since it led directly to the exchanges in Table 12.1. After Iowa petered out, Mr. A resumed his quest for Mr. B's biography (Q means a question, R means a reply, A or B means the speaker, and the number of the question or reply is the ordinal position of the item in the snippet; notation as in Silverstein, 1997).

Table 12.1 about here

Silverstein's Analysis of The Text in The Pointing Phase

Silverstein identifies "stretches of interactionally-effected denotational text," These are runs of local cohesion indexed via references to past or present locations. In QA7 "did you go to school there or uh," Mr. A formulates his probe about Mr. B's past temporal location, "thenB," with "go to school," although his goal was actually to elicit information about Mr. B's relationship to the past spatial location, "thereB." This indexical probe, "go to school," carries a framework for coherence into the next step of the conversation. The most recent denotational frame before QA7 was that of Iowa (either Iowa City and/or State). This would have been the default frame for the emphasized "there" of QA7. Mr. B in his reply at Rb7.1 picks up this frame, when he says, "I did go to school there." Yet, ambiguity remains because Mr. A's "there" can

be a substitute for either “*in* Iowa” or “*at* Iowa” and which, “*in*” or “*at*,” is left unsaid. In other words, it could equally designate “^{C/S}thereB” (“*in*”) or “^UthereB” (“*at*”) (C means City, S State, and U University).

Mr. B does nothing to disambiguate the frame in RB7.1, where he repeats the precise formulation of Mr. A's QA7, using the same predicated phrase “go to school there.” Mr. B however continues to clarify the temporal order of the paradigm that he has set up, but still not the institutional affiliation: He has gone to school “*here*B,” he says in RB7.2, as well as “*there*B” in RB7.1. The result, as Silverstein pointed out, is a deictically organized progression of references that sketches Mr. B's academic biography (□ _t means temporal succession):

in or *at* ^{U/C}Chicago □ _t *in* or *at* ^{U/S}Iowa □ _t *in* or *at* ^{U/C}Chicago

This contains multiple ambiguities of deictic reference between “*in*” and “*at*,” but the most important of these for the remainder of the snippet is, what “Chicago” is Mr. B speaking of: “The University of” (“*at*”) or “the City of” (“*in*”) ? Mr. A pursues the topic once again and asks in QA8 “an' you wént to undergraduate *hére* or” if Mr. B had been an undergraduate at the University of Chicago, using a non inverted, confirmatory question that preserves the exact predicate form of Mr. B's RB7, the “go to school.”³ Even this formulation by Mr. A is not without “denotational-textual wiggle-room,” as Silverstein described it. It would have been possible for Mr. B to have replied as though Mr. A had been asking if he had been an undergraduate “^C*hére*,” that is, in the City of Chicago, simply by saying “yes,” for example.

Yet “for reasons unknown,” Mr. B chooses to reveal that “most important of emblems of identity in professional- and upper-class America, the “old school tie,” and supplies the long-sought information in RB8 (“*in* Chicágo *át*, uh, Loyola”). Mr. B at last differentiates City and University — although apparently with reluctance. The result is the following now clarified deictic structure in which the only ambiguity remaining is whether “Iowa” meant the University as well as the State:

in ^CChicago, *at* ^ULoyola □ _t *in* or *at* ^{U/S}Iowa □ _t *in* ^CChicago, *at* ^UChicago.

As it turned out, Mr. A also “went to undergraduate” at an (albeit different) Jesuit institution. The conversation thereupon took off and Mr. A's hard-won discovery led to many nonproblematic exchanges on the theme of Jesuit education.

Analysis of the Pointing

³ “[Mr. A] seems to blend two simultaneous informational quests in his utterance, which makes for a rather strange discontinuous colloquial phrase with focal stress, “wént ... here” superimposed upon the ... repetition of [an] earlier construction... . The different focalization of these two blended constructions leaves no doubt to us analysts which is the more important piece of information being asked for; it is the undergraduate institution with which Mr. B's identity can be affiliated” (Silverstein, 1997, p. 293).

Not included in Silverstein's analysis of the A-B text is the creative use by both speakers of the gesture space via pointing. Analysis of the metaphoric deictic structures in the conversation will lead to an explanation of Mr. B's unexpected capitulation in RB8. In general, the patterns of pointing were:

Mr. A points only into the shared or landmark space.

Mr. B points into this space and also points to the left and, crucially, once to the right.

In the rest of this chapter, “left” and “right” refer to directions from the point of view of the speakers. Mr. A was seated to Mr. B's right and the shared space was the overlapping part of their personal spaces between them (Özyürek, 2000). This had the advantage that left, center, and right were the same for both speakers.

The shared space acquired meaning as the discourse topic, and this meaning and its shifting values and the contrasts of other gestures to it are the subject of the analysis to follow. The shared space initially had the meaning of Mr. B's academic past in Iowa, “Iowa-then.” As noted previously, this reference is ambiguous between the State of Iowa and the University of Iowa, and which was meant was never spelled out. The meaning at RB7.1 when Mr. B pointed to the shared space and said “I did go to school [there],”⁴ thus could have been either the State or the University of Iowa.

A corresponding ambiguity exists during RB7.2-3 when Mr. B continued, “[I went to school *hère*] [álsó],” and pointed two times to the left, that is, away from the shared space. As with the verbal deixis, “*hère*,” this left space could have meant either the *City* of Chicago or the *University* of Chicago, and following Silverstein, is designated “^{C/U}Chicago-then.”

The meaning of the deictic field clearly changed for Mr. B at RB7.6, when he said “so I [came back]” and pointed to the shared space that previously had meant “Iowa-then” (the status of the shared space at RB7.4-5 is unclear). This meaning shift could have hinged on temporal updating. Mr. B wanted to move the topic into the present and thus contrasted “now” to the “then” that had been the left space at RB7.2-3. This contrast put “now” into the shared space, and “Chicago” came along with it. However, once imported, “Chicago” too became part of the shared space for Mr. B. Thus, at RB7.6, the shared space meant “Chicago-now,” and this became Mr. B's new thematic reference point. But which “Chicago” – the City or the University?

I argue that, at this moment, if not sooner (for we can't be sure about RB7.4-5), the shared space meant for Mr. B the *City*. The crucial indication is that Mr. B pointed to the *right* at RB7.7 and hedged the reference to coming back with “[kind of /].” He

⁴ In describing gestures, square brackets show when the hands were in motion; / signifies an unfilled speech pause. All gestures are pointing, Mr. A's mostly with the classic G-hand shape, Mr. B's with a loose 5-hand shape (see Fig. 12.1 for typical gestures).

was evidently saying that he had come back to Chicago, but hadn't come back to *Chicago*, and placed this Chicago₁ versus Chicago₂ opposition on a new shared versus right space axis.

I claim that the shared and right spaces cannot have the same meaning; that one is the City and the other is the University (or at least is *not-the-City*), although we cannot say from the spatial contrast itself which space has which meaning. Subsequent pointing however soon makes this clear.

Mr. A now asks his fatal question (QA8): “an’ [you wént to undergraduate hère or]” and points again to the shared space with an extended hold that is maintained during Mr. B's response. Mr. A's use is unambiguous: The space means for him the University (see note 3). Mr. B's response at RB8 also points to this space while saying, crucially, “[in Chicágo] at, uh, Loyola” – the unexpected capitulation after a career of evasion.

The preposition “in” shows that Mr. B was indicating the City as opposed to the University. Thus the shared topic space for Mr. B at this point meant the City, not the University. This in turn suggests that the *right* space at RB7.7 meant the University and not the City.

This meaning allocation moreover would explain the hedge “kind of.” What Mr. B meant when he said “so I came back kind of,” was that he had returned to one kind of Chicago (the City), but it was not the Chicago that might have been supposed in this conversation – the University where Mr. B and Mr. A were students and where the conversation was taking place (or alternatively, the “kind of” hedge flagged *not-the-City*).

That Mr. B hedged and introduced a new spatial contrast also suggests that he was aware of the “^{C/U}Chicago” ambiguity. Had he been thinking only of his own meaning of “^CChicago” for the shared space, there would have been no motivation for introducing a new space for “^UChicago” (or “*not* ^CChicago”) and the hedge. In other words, Mr. B, without realizing it, tipped his hand that his persistent “^{C/U}Chicago” ambiguity had been intentional.

That Mr. A and Mr. B had conflicting meanings for the shared topic space and that Mr. B was aware of this also explains why Mr. B gave up his resistance at this very moment. This is the puzzle that remains after Silverstein's analysis. As noted earlier, Mr. B easily could have continued dodging Mr. A by perpetuating the ambiguity, had he wished, merely by answering QA8 with “yes.”

However, the shared space and “here” meant the City for Mr. B whereas they meant the University for Mr. A. This contradiction confronted Mr. B with an interactional problem on a new level: the need to cease being merely evasive and to start lying; apparently Mr. B did not make this choice.

Mr. B could not avoid his dilemma by not pointing: Mr. A had already pointed into the shared space with the unambiguous meaning of “^UChicago” and Mr. B had previously pointed to it with the opposite meaning of “^CChicago”; moreover, Mr. A was *continuing* to point at the shared space with the contradictory meaning; Mr. B's confrontation with morality was inescapable.

That Mr. A maintained his pointing gesture during the entirety of Mr. B's response suggests that for Mr. A, also, there was a sense that the central gesture space had become a field of confrontation.

Thus, the role of pointing into the gesture space was an active one in this stretch of conversation. Pointing contributed to the dynamics of the conversation and included such interpersonal factors as evasion, probing, and confession. Table 12.2 summarizes the meanings given to the right, shared, and left spaces in the snippet. Figure 12.1 shows the phases of the denouement – Mr. B's pointing both immediately before and during his hedge, and Mr. A's held deixis in the shared space as Mr. B also pointed in the shared space and answered the fatal question.

Figure 1 about here

Table 2 about here

ANALYSIS OF B'S GROWTH POINT AT RB8

Although Mr. B's utterance “[in Chicágo] át, uh, Loyola” displays minimal linguistic structure, it is interesting as a microcosm of the conditions under which utterances form in general. These conditions can be analyzed with the concept of a growth point (McNeill, 1992; McNeill & Duncan, 2000). Such an analysis will help generalize the growth point concept by exhibiting a case where the core idea of an utterance is abstract and moral rather than (as in most earlier examples) visual and spatial.

The growth point (GP) is the name we give to an analytic unit combining imagery and linguistic categorial content. GPs are inferred from the totality of communicative events with special focus on speech-gesture synchrony and co-expressivity. It is called a growth point because it is meant to be the initial form of a thought unit out of which a dynamic process of organization emerges. It is also called a GP because it is the theoretical unit in which the principles that explain mental growth – differentiation, internalization, dialectic, and reorganization – also apply to real-time utterance generation by adults (and children). A final reason for calling it a GP is that it addresses the concept that there is a specific starting point for a thought. Although an idea unit continues out of the preceding context and has ramifications in later speech, it does not exist at all times, and comes into being at some specific moment; the formation of a growth point is this moment, theoretically.

Growth Point and Background.

In the view of the GP concept, thinking is carried out fundamentally in terms of *contrasts*. The gestalt principle of a figure differentiated from a ground applies. The background of thinking indexes and is constrained by external conditions, cognitive, social, and material, but the background is also under the control of the speaker; it is a *mental construction*; it is part of the speaker's effort to construct a meaningful context and a thought unit within it. The speaker shapes the background in a certain way, in order to give significance to the intended contrast, and the background and the contrast are constructed together. The joint product results in the differentiation of a new meaning from a background. Obviously, in this view, meaning and background are inseparable in their existence.

I use the terms *field of oppositions* and *significant (newsworthy) contrast* to refer to this constructed background and the differentiation of GPs. All of this is meant as a dynamic system in which new fields of oppositions are formed and new GPs or psychological predicates (Vygotsky, 1987) are differentiated.

Mr. B's GP.

The concept of a GP elucidates Mr. B's thinking at the critical juncture when he confronted the moral crisis of lying or telling the truth. Under the prevailing imperative to orient himself to the proffered topic of his personal biography (itself a product of the pointing procedure), Mr. B's thinking was dominated by the distinction between ^CChicago and ^UChicago on which his biography turned, and his apparent wish to blanket this distinction under the ambiguous word "Chicago."

In the case of RB8, the field of opposition, as Mr. B construed it, was something like To Lie About Loyola versus To Tell The Truth About Loyola. Mr. B's chosen contrast in this field was the To-Tell-The-Truth pole. That is, Mr. B's meaning at this point was not just the denotational content of "in Chicago, at Loyola," but also the moral content of coming out with the truth when the alternative was lying. This was a product of his current field of oppositions. This hidden content was, I believe, the core of his meaning at this moment, and the various parts of the meaning materialized in one or both of the modalities, speech and gesture (in other words, I claim, this utterance could not have significantly deviated from this form), to wit:

Mr. B's contradiction with Mr. A materialized via pointing at the space that Mr. A had designated as "^UChicago" but meaning by this space, "^CChicago."

The "in" lexical choice brought out ^CChicago, which is the "Truth" alternative.

The "in" – "at" succession arose from the "^{C/U}Chicago" ambiguity that Mr. B had been perpetuating. Having separated the City meaning with "in," Mr. B went on to lay out the University component with "at."

The stress pattern, "in Chicágo – át," displays precisely this contrast within a consistent rhythmic and vocalic pattern (i.e., "in Chicago - át," or "in Chicágo - at Loyóla" – the two other possible combinations – twist the rhythm and the

poetics, and lose the contrast that splits out the University concept as something distinct from “^CChicago”).

The “át,” in turn, led to “Loyola” but with hesitancy as if completion of the City-University paradigm had taken on a life of its own and was unfolding somewhat against the will of the speaker or at least with lingering uncertainty.

The conditions leading to RB8 included: (a) Mr. A and Mr. B's joint orientation to the shared gesture space, (b) Mr. B's awareness of his contradiction with Mr. A over the meaning of the shared space, and (c) the role of this contradiction in creating the moral dilemma that Mr. B ultimately confronted. The contradiction with Mr. A was one pole of the utterance and the resulting moral dilemma for Mr. B was the other. The contradiction was highlighted by Mr. A's protracted pointing to the shared space while Mr. B invoked the “^CChicago” meaning. Together, these poles were the direct determinants of the form of the utterance that we observe. The GP thus incorporated information about the contradiction with Mr. A and Mr. B's awareness of it, plus Mr. B's sense that he was confronting a moral dilemma and his decision to resolve it. Mr. B's unpacking of the GP into “[in Chicágo] át, uh, Loyola” grew out of the contrasts built into it, despite Mr. B's squeamishness over the final revelation. Thus, according to this model, the utterance was a product of Mr. B's individual thinking at a particular moment in a specific pragmatic–discourse context, and encompassed interpersonal, moral, discourse, and historical-biographical dimensions.

Mapping Thinking Onto Space

The shared space (indicated only in gestures) thus had a compelling reality for Mr. A and Mr. B. Mr. B's immediate cognitive experience was mapped onto this space and its left and right alternates. Pointing worked like referential deixis, only in reverse. By pointing, Mr. A and Mr. B created and instantiated referents in the discourse. The critical “object” (^{C/U}Chicago) was located in the shared space that existed for both Mr. A and Mr. B, and became the focus of Mr. B's moral dilemma – what was he to say it *was*? By pointing at QA8 and holding the gesture, Mr. A made clear that he thought it was “U”; however, Mr. B knew that it was “C.” The conflict was inseparable from the pointing procedure, without which there would have been no conflict, and no dilemma.

THE INTRAPSYCHIC/INTERPSYCHIC INTERFACE

I conclude with a brief statement of the implications of the Mr. A-Mr. B conversation for the relationship of the social context of a conversation to the individual thought processes of the participants in it. The dilemma that Mr. B confronted occurred at the interface of mind and the social context. We can regard it as at the interface of Vygotsky's (1987) two planes, the *interpsychic* and the *intrapsychic* (the interpsychic alone tends to be discussed in the conversation analytic literature where Vygotsky's theory often undergoes an “intraectomy”; cf. Duranti & Goodwin, 1992). The GP (awareness of the contradiction, the moral dilemma) is intrapsychic in the Vygotskian dichotomy and yet it interfaces with the interpsychic plane (the interactional game, evasiveness, confession). It is important to maintain the inter/intra distinction, lest the

mind be regarded as nothing more than a passive sketchpad of the social interaction. The challenge, which was seen clearly by Vygotsky, is to figure out how the mind remains autonomous while it engages the social context. The GP presents a picture of how this can be done. The GP describes how individual thinking internalizes content from the “interactionally effected” frame to create idea units that support, indeed cannot help but generate, textual coherence. Although interactional content appears on the two planes, the content has different functions on each. This is the key to their interfacing and their distinctiveness. The most visible manifestation of functional differentiation occurred at RB8 when both Mr. B and Mr. A were simultaneously pointing at the shared space but had opposite intended meanings. *Interpsychically*, this was a tussle over the meaning of the space. *Intrapsychically*, the tussling had the further meaning that it embodied Mr. B's dilemma, whether to lie or tell the truth. On this *intra* plane, the tussle was part of Mr. B's personal mental life and was subject to autochthonous forces of his own (his wish to camouflage his past, his rejection of lying), whereas on the *inter* plane it was subject to the social forces of the interaction between Mr. A and Mr. B (politeness constraints in particular; cf. Brown and Levinson, 1990). The point is, both planes are sources of representations running through Mr. B's mind at this moment, as evidenced in the precise form of the utterance at RB8. Moreover, the very construction of the meaning – his Chicago past – as a deictic field with entities, an origo, and a perspective is a model translated from the *inter* to the *intra* plane. The GP as a unit of thinking is the point where these various forces come together. Although the GP is itself on the *intra* plane, it ties together influences on thought and action that scatter over both the *interpsychic* and *intrapsychic* planes. Vygotsky said that everything appears in development twice, first on the social plane, then on the individual. The same logic and direction of influence applies to the GP. Vygotsky saw the necessity of a unit that encompasses this transformation, invoking the concepts of psychological predicates and inner speech to express this unity in the minds of socially embedded individuals. The growth point concept is meant to be heir to these insights.

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Table 1
Selection from a Conversation Between Two Male Students

Mr. A	Mr. B
.	
QA6 how do you like Chicago compared to	
QA7 did you [go to school thére] or uh <i>points to shared space</i>	
	RB7.1 I did go to school [there] <i>points to shared space</i>
	RB7.2 [I went to school hére] <i>points to left</i>
	RB7.3 [álso] <i>circles to left</i>
uh-huh	RB7.4 [I] <i>points to shared space</i>
	RB7.5 [/ um] <i>points to left</i>
	RB7.6 so I [came back] <i>points to shared space</i>
oh, uh-huh	RB7.7 [kind of /] <i>points to right</i>
QA8 an' [you wént to undergraduate hére or (A's gesture held)] <i>points to shared space</i>	
	RB8 [in Chicágo] át, uh, Loyola <i>points to shared space</i>

Table 2

Meanings Attributed to the Right, Center, and Left Spaces by Messers A and B

	Right	Shared	Left
QA7 did you go to ...		S/U _{Iowa-then}	
RB7.1 I did go to ...		S/U _{Iowa-then}	
RB7.2 I went here			C/U _{Chicago-then}
RB7.3 also			C/U _{Chicago-then}
RB7.4 I		??	
RB7.5 /um			??
RB7.6 so I came back		C _{Chicago-now}	
RB7.7 kind of	U _{Chicago-now}		
QA8 you went to undergraduate here		U _{Chicago-now} (held through the following)	
RB8 in Chicago at Loyola		C _{Chicago-now}	




Fig. 12.1(A) Mr. B's two- handed deixis in the shared space with "so I [came back]." (B) Mr. B's immediately following 2-handed deixis in the right space with the hedge, "[kind of /]." (C) Mr. A's held deixis in the shared space as Mr. B also points in the shared space and answers the fatal question with "[in Chicago]." Reproduced with permission.

